U.S. Munitions Shortage Strains Ability to Defend Allies Amid Global Crises

Weapons are being consumed faster than the United States can produce them. That mismatch became impossible to ignore after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, then intensified sharply in 2024 when Iran launched barrages of missiles and drones against US partners in the Gulf following American and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets. The burning rate of advanced munitions during Operation Epic Fury exposed a critical vulnerability: the systems through which America delivers arms to its allies cannot keep pace with the speed at which conflicts demand them.

The threat extends beyond the Middle East. A potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific represents another scenario where existing supply and delivery mechanisms could prove dangerously inadequate. Yet the problem is not primarily about manufacturing capacity alone. Even if US industry accelerates production, the bureaucratic architecture governing defense sales remains a bottleneck that prevents equipment from reaching partners who need it to protect themselves and shared interests.

The solution will take years to fully implement. But the Trump administration can act immediately under existing law and policy to unblock the Foreign Military Sales process without requiring new legislation. These steps matter most urgently for Gulf partners now struggling to replenish air defense munitions while bracing for sustained Iranian threats.

For decades, the Arms Export Control Act has governed how the United States sells defense equipment, services, and training to foreign governments. More advanced weapons and those involving sensitive technology move through the Foreign Military Sales process, which requires State Department approval and Defense Security Cooperation Agency administration. Less sensitive equipment travels through Direct Commercial Sales, where US companies sell directly to foreign customers. The system is designed to ensure sales align with US foreign policy and advance national security objectives.

In practice, the process has become a maze. Complex coordination among multiple stakeholders, compliance requirements spanning several agencies, congressional notifications, production delays, and contracting procedures mean that years can pass between a foreign government’s formal request and the signing of a contract. Production and delivery add years more. This timeline makes it nearly impossible for the United States and its partners to respond to threats that are escalating and changing in real time.

The immediate pathway forward involves three near-term actions, all executable under current authority. First, the Trump administration should continue leveraging the emergency authority provision in the Arms Export Control Act to replenish Gulf air defense stocks. This provision, invoked in 1979, 1984, 1990, and 2019 to address Iranian threats, allows the administration to waive the congressional review period when an emergency exists. It sends both a practical and symbolic message of commitment to partners facing immediate danger.

Second, the administration should expand co-production of certain defense equipment with Gulf partners. This approach addresses the supply and delivery crisis over the longer term by distributing manufacturing responsibility and building regional capacity.

Third, the administration should reclassify items currently designated as Foreign Military Sales only, moving them to Direct Commercial Sales eligibility where the original justifications for “advanced” or “sensitive” classification no longer hold. Many criteria that warranted such designations decades ago no longer apply to current technology.

President Trump has already begun positioning the executive branch to pursue these reforms. Last year he issued executive orders titled “Reforming Foreign Defense Sales” and “Establishing an America First Arms Transfer Strategy,” which prioritize US strategic partnerships, identify key countries and defense articles for expedited review, streamline approval processes, and improve burden-sharing with allies. These orders provide the framework within which the three near-term actions can be executed.

The secretary of state holds delegated authority under current law to implement many of these changes. Working in consultation with the secretary of defense, the administration can sustain emergency replenishment, expand co-production through existing channels, and reclassify Foreign Military Sales-only items to Direct Commercial Sales eligibility. To drive efficiency further, the administration could publish performance metrics specific to Ukraine and Gulf operations, designate priority partners for relief from certain controls on unmanned aerial systems and missile technology, and apply the Defense Technology Security Administration’s “release in principle” determination to recurring Gulf air defense replenishment. That determination provides conceptual approval for sales that can dramatically accelerate the process and give partners clarity about which acquisitions are feasible.

The 2024 to 2026 confrontations with Iran revealed both the limits and the value of integrated US security partnerships in the region. Under Central Command leadership, the US, Israel, and Gulf states built an integrated air and missile defense system linking sensors and interceptors across the region. When Iran attacked in 2024, Gulf countries achieved interception rates exceeding 90 percent, a success rooted largely in US equipment, training, and the integrated air and missile defense framework. These results demonstrate that the US remains the security partner of choice for the Gulf, but only if Washington can sustain the supply of equipment at the rate threats demand.

A 2024 Defense Security Cooperation Agency study on Foreign Military Sales noted that the State and Defense departments needed to clarify and codify additional responsibilities for managing those requirements. While this finding reflects genuine interagency coordination challenges, the tools to optimize Foreign Military Sales functions already exist through application of current law and recent executive orders. Some members of Congress may worry about accelerating arms sales to allies, but within relevant committees, documented support exists for strengthening Ukrainian defenses, enabling Israel and Gulf states to counter Iranian threats, and maintaining US access and influence as discussions grow about potential American disengagement from the Middle East.

Failing to reform the Foreign Military Sales process exacerbates production and delivery challenges for the defense industrial base in the short term. Over time, inaction favors adversaries of the United States and its partners. By moving arms more rapidly to those who need them most, the US can revitalize its defense industrial base and help contain the spread of global conflict. Whether the administration moves quickly enough to match the pace of the threats already in motion remains the open question.