Students packed Mergenthaler Hall on Friday, September 11, as the Aronson Center for International Studies opened its Fall 2026 speaker series with a presentation that carries direct consequences for American foreign policy and the public’s stake in global energy stability. Ryan Calder, an associate professor in the Department of Sociology, delivered the talk titled “The Arab Gulf States, Global Energy Markets, and the 2026 U.S. Midterm Elections,” examining how six Middle Eastern nations view the upcoming vote and what that means for ordinary Americans who depend on stable energy markets and secure international relationships.
The presentation focused on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman, all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Calder’s central argument was that these nations do not hold uniform political preferences in American elections, nor do they maintain equally strong ties with the United States. Their foreign policy interests are distinct and sometimes competing, shaped by regional rivalries and a deteriorating confidence in American commitments.
The relationship between the United States and Gulf States has grown more fraught since the Iran war began. “If there’s one sort of big picture conclusion, it is that the Iran War caused all of the GCC countries to lose faith in their relationship with the United States,” Calder said. That erosion of trust complicates any assumption that these nations would rally behind a particular American political party, with real implications for the diplomatic and energy arrangements that affect everyday life at home.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE maintain the strongest historical connections to Washington. Calder traced this lineage back decades. “Saudi Arabia has a very long historical relationship with the United States; you can go back to any president since the 1940s, since Roosevelt, and we see this strong relationship between the House of Saud, that is, the kings, the monarchy of Saudi Arabia, and the presidents, both Republican and Democratic in the United States,” he said. Yet even these long-standing partnerships have been tested by recent geopolitical shifts.
Internal divisions among Gulf States themselves further complicate the picture. Calder referenced the blockade of Qatar that lasted from 2017 to 2021, during which Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait applied economic and diplomatic pressure on Doha over its perceived ties to certain Islamist organizations. “Another thing that has happened is a widening of the rift between GCC members,” Calder noted. These six nations do not operate as a unified bloc, a fact that matters when American policymakers, acting on behalf of the public, must navigate the region.
When asked about electoral preferences, Calder rejected simplistic framings. The absence of former President Trump from the 2026 ballot does not automatically translate into Gulf State support for Democrats. Instead, these governments appear to pursue a more nuanced objective: they may prefer a constrained American presidency, one without overwhelming congressional majorities that would allow unfettered executive action. The distinction matters because the balance of power in Congress shapes the foreign and energy policies that flow back to citizens through fuel prices, security commitments, and trade.
The ongoing Iran war has become a central concern for Gulf States and, by extension, for the public interests tied to regional stability. A brief ceasefire in June and July offered temporary relief before hostilities resumed. Calder suggested that GCC members are seeking stability and predictability from American leadership rather than ideological alignment with either major party.
The complexity Calder outlined reflects a reality that resists partisan reduction. “Things are changing very fast. It’s certainly not a sort of situation where we can say, well, the Arab Gulf States are in favor of [Democrats] winning or Republicans winning, or something like that,” Calder said. Regional powers pursue their own strategic interests, which may or may not align with American political narratives, and citizens on both sides of the Atlantic and Gulf live with the consequences either way.
Following the formal presentation, Calder fielded questions from attendees on topics ranging from the military capabilities of GCC nations to the geopolitical significance of the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway through which a substantial share of the world’s oil supply passes. The breadth of those questions suggests that scholarly interest in Gulf affairs is inseparable from the public’s stake in what happens next, as the midterms approach and the Iran conflict remains unresolved.