Gulf's Hidden Infrastructure at Risk: Why Citizens Need Regional Energy Safeguards

Millions of people across the Gulf wake each day dependent on systems most of them never see. Oil refineries, liquefied natural gas facilities, power grids and desalination plants are woven together in a web so tightly interconnected that a strike on one node can cut power to hospitals, halt the flow of drinking water, threaten food supplies and freeze maritime trade. No shared regional agreement yet exists to protect these systems from attack.

The 2019 strikes on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais facilities made the stakes concrete. Damage to a handful of sites temporarily disrupted a substantial portion of the Kingdom’s oil production and immediately unsettled global markets. The deeper lesson was not lost output alone, but the dangerous concentration of infrastructure on which parts of the global economy depend. Qatar’s position as one of the world’s largest liquefied natural gas exporters shows that the region’s vulnerability extends well beyond oil. Disruption to gas production, liquefaction or exports could quickly place international supply and prices under severe pressure.

The security challenge has since grown more complex. Drones and cyber operations have extended vulnerability beyond physical facilities to control centres, communications systems and digital energy networks. The Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, Bab Al-Mandab and the Red Sea form maritime corridors where disruption at a single point can raise shipping, insurance and energy-trading costs across a far wider area.

In many Gulf states, energy security cannot be separated from water security. Desalination plants depend on electricity, fuel, control centres and backup systems. A prolonged disruption could affect hospitals, public health, food security and the basic conditions of urban life. An attack on energy infrastructure is therefore not necessarily an attack on an economic asset alone. It may effectively become an attack on drinking water, healthcare, transport and the daily lives of millions of ordinary people.

The region currently lacks the conditions that would make traditional deterrence stable. The number of state and non-state actors, the difficulty of attributing drone and cyber operations and the possibility of decisions made on incomplete information all increase the risk of miscalculation. A limited incident, or the premature attribution of responsibility, could trigger a chain of retaliation that none of the parties can control. Each side possesses the ability to strike an adversary’s infrastructure, yet this form of destructive deterrence holds only when red lines are clear, communication channels are active and responsibility for an attack can be reliably established.

The proposed solution is an energy non-aggression pact: a limited but practical agreement protecting critical energy infrastructure and the essential services that depend on it. Its purpose would be to transform mutual infrastructure vulnerability into mutual restraint. Such an initiative would only be meaningful if it moved beyond narrow blocs and included the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Iran and Iraq, according to their different roles in the region’s energy geography and maritime security. No durable arrangement can exclude a major part of the Gulf’s security equation.

Under such a pact, regional states would commit not to attack oil refineries, export terminals, liquefied natural gas facilities, major pipelines, power stations, electricity grids, energy control centres, desalination plants and their critical backup systems. The commitment should also prohibit support for attacks by non-state actors or proxy groups, as well as the use of drones or destructive cyber operations to disrupt essential services. Beyond refraining from attacks, states should cooperate in prevention, technical investigations and efforts to stop their territory from being used against another country’s critical infrastructure.

The pact would not replace international humanitarian law, which already protects civilian objects (the legal status of dual-use energy facilities can become contested when an installation serves both civilian needs and military operations). Its added value would lie in defining protected infrastructure more precisely at the regional level, creating an additional commitment to restraint and addressing grey areas involving proxy, drone and cyber operations.

Meanwhile, in a region marked by profound mistrust, verification should not begin with intrusive inspections or a large new organisation. The first step could be an emergency energy hotline and the rapid exchange of information about attacks, cyber incidents and sudden disruptions. A non-political technical working group could later use satellite data, maritime insurance reports, market information and independent expert assessments to reduce the danger of premature attribution. The parties could then develop shared crisis-management protocols and arrangements for the emergency supply of electricity, fuel, spare parts and alternative export routes.

Oman could serve as an initial facilitator, given its record of mediation and its channels of communication with rival parties. Qatar’s strategic position in the liquefied natural gas market and Saudi Arabia’s production capacity and political weight in global oil markets make their involvement essential. Iran’s participation would be equally indispensable: no Gulf energy-security arrangement can function without one of the region’s most consequential geographical and energy actors.

External powers and major energy consumers, from the United States and China to Europe and Asia’s leading economies, would all benefit from a stable Gulf. Their role, however, should be supportive and facilitative rather than a substitute for regional ownership. A pact perceived as the project of one outside power would soon become another arena for geopolitical competition.

Serious obstacles remain: deep mistrust among states, the difficulty of attributing drone and cyber attacks, the role of armed non-state actors and disagreements over dual-use facilities. These challenges are not a reason to abandon the proposal. They are a reason to begin with a limited, technical and phased arrangement. Such a pact would not end the Middle East’s conflicts. It could, however, prevent the next crisis from holding electricity, water, fuel, hospitals, ports and the vital systems serving millions of people hostage. No state can regard its own infrastructure as secure while that of its neighbours remains under constant threat, and transforming that shared vulnerability into shared restraint may be the most practical first step available toward a more humane regional security architecture.