Gulf residents face mounting risks as attacks on water, power and transport systems intens

Millions of Gulf residents depend on the same oil facilities, desalination plants, airports, and ports that have been struck repeatedly since late February. Between late February and late July, Iran and its backed groups in Iraq launched at least 172 attacks on non-military targets across Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Twenty-five of those incidents resulted in deaths or injuries to civilians or workers. More than 70 percent of strikes on critical infrastructure caused damage, fire, or both at their intended targets.

The scale of the campaign is striking. Those 172 attacks represent roughly 18 percent of all Iranian land attacks in the region, with the remainder directed at military installations and other unspecified objectives. The breadth of targets makes clear that Iran has pursued a deliberate strategy to disrupt the economic and daily functioning of Gulf states, threatening the infrastructure that underpins ordinary life, commerce, and regional stability.

Energy infrastructure has been the primary focus, accounting for 48 percent of attacks on non-military targets. That category includes oil facilities, gas complexes, power plants, and desalination systems that supply water and electricity to millions of residents. Airports and ports accounted for 27 percent of attacks, while industrial facilities, financial centers, data centers, and residential and commercial high-rise buildings made up 19 percent. Government and diplomatic sites represented the remaining 6 percent.

The UAE and Kuwait have borne the heaviest burden. The UAE, accounting for 28 percent of all non-military infrastructure attacks, has seen repeated strikes on oil and gas facilities, transport hubs, and economic zones. Targets have included the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company’s al-Ruways Industrial City, Jebel Ali Port, Abu Dhabi International Airport, the ADNOC Habshan gas complex, and Khalifa Economic Zones. Beyond physical damage, these attacks have weakened the UAE’s international standing as a stable hub for investment, technology, and transportation. Kuwait, targeted in 25 percent of attacks, has experienced concentrated strikes on oil refineries including Mina Abdullah and Mina al-Ahmadi, oil rigs, power stations, and the Shuayba power and desalination plant. Kuwait International Airport has been hit repeatedly.

Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have also faced significant exposure, with energy infrastructure as the primary target. In Bahrain, the Bahrain Petroleum Company oil refinery, Bahrain International Airport, and Khalifa Bin Salman Port have been repeatedly struck. In Saudi Arabia, attacks have focused on the Riyadh Diplomatic Quarter, the Saudi Arabian Oil Company Total Refining and Petrochemical Company refinery in al-Jubayl, and Aramco facilities across multiple locations.

The intensity of attacks has fluctuated with the broader conflict. During the first phase, from late February to early April, non-military infrastructure accounted for around 19 percent of Iranian retaliatory attacks. When a ceasefire took effect and negotiations proceeded through mid-June, attacks on civilian infrastructure declined sharply, with Iran shifting focus to military targets and maritime operations in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Since mid-June, however, infrastructure targeting has resumed at similar levels, suggesting Iran views such attacks as an effective pressure tactic during periods of military escalation.

The geographic pattern has also shifted. During the initial phase, the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain faced the greatest exposure. Since mid-June, Iran has not targeted non-military infrastructure in the UAE, Qatar, and Oman, concentrating instead on Kuwait and Bahrain, which have recorded 10 and seven attacks respectively during this period.

By contrast, those shifts reflect different diplomatic stances among Gulf states. The UAE has pursued a more conciliatory approach toward Tehran since the ceasefire began, restoring flights and trade while maintaining ties with the US and Israel. Qatar and Oman have positioned themselves as mediators between Iran and the US, reducing Tehran’s incentive to target them. Kuwait and Bahrain have maintained hostile relations with Iran and host significant US military bases and assets. Both countries conducted attacks on Iran in early July.

The outlook for civilian populations is sobering. Should conflict resume, Kuwait and Bahrain are likely to remain the most targeted states, though Saudi Arabia’s critical role in global energy markets makes its oil infrastructure a valuable target. The 27 July attack on Saudi Aramco’s Abqayq facility demonstrates that major oil infrastructure remains a prime objective. Oil and gas facilities, power plants, water desalination plants, airports, and ports will almost certainly remain at risk. Disruption to energy sectors increases economic pressure on Gulf states and global energy prices, while disruption to airports and ports harms passenger and cargo traffic, trade, and energy exports.

Diplomatic engagement has reduced the UAE’s short-term exposure, but this protection is fragile. Abu Dhabi’s close ties with the US and Israel could increase its risk if Iran faces heavy military attacks on its own critical infrastructure. Dubai International Airport, among other major assets, provides Iran with high-value targets that could cause wider disruption if the conflict dramatically re-escalates.

Several factors will shape Iran’s decisions about targeting civilian infrastructure. Gulf states pursuing de-escalation with Tehran face lower short-term risk, and Saudi Arabia appears likely to follow the UAE’s diplomatic approach as frustration with US security guarantees grows. Countries hosting US military operations, particularly Kuwait and Bahrain, will remain more exposed. Iran is likely to increase attacks during escalation periods, particularly as declining interceptor stockpiles make successful strikes more probable. The United States has reportedly allowed some projectiles to pass when they have not threatened US forces, further reducing the defensive shield available to Gulf populations.

Whether diplomacy can outpace the military logic driving these attacks, and whether the populations living near desalination plants, refineries, and airports will see that protection hold, remains the central question facing the region. For detailed analysis, see https://middle-east-online.com/en/gulfs-critical-infrastructure-presents-lasting-vulnerability-iran-exploit.