As Saudi and UAE mend ties, Yemenis brace for fallout

For Yemenis, the latest Houthi advances have brought a familiar pattern: outside powers recalibrating their rivalry over the country’s future while the population bears the consequences. The lightning gains by the Houthis have given Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates an opening to set aside a rupture over Yemen’s political makeup less than a year ago. Whether that rapprochement helps or harms ordinary Yemenis depends on a question that remains unanswered: whether the two Gulf powers can agree on who should govern the country and on what terms.

The public signs of renewed dialogue came quickly. On October 18, Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman met UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, praising the “historical relations between our two brotherly countries.” The official readout announced no Yemen military agreement. But the Guardian separately reported that Abu Dhabi had agreed to resume payments to government-aligned forces it had previously backed in southern Yemen, where it has long sought influence. In exchange, the Saudi air force would support those forces against the Houthis. Numerous prominent Saudi and Emirati media outlets have since published conciliatory commentary, calling for an end to public feuding.

That shift in tone is an effort to sideline the December 2025 rupture, when UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces captured large parts of Hadramawt and al-Mahra, provinces bordering Saudi Arabia. Riyadh saw the advance as a direct threat to its national security and responded with severe public recriminations, an airstrike on a weapons shipment at Mukalla port that it said had arrived in support of the STC, and an abrupt demand that remaining UAE forces leave Yemen. The confrontation also severely weakened the STC.

The underlying disagreement predates the recent crisis. Both countries led the war against the Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, starting in 2015, but Riyadh backed the internationally recognized government while Abu Dhabi cultivated southern armed groups, including the separatist STC. The Saudis wanted a unified government capable of defeating the Houthis; the UAE prioritized southern independence as a route to influence over ports, including Aden near the mouth of the Red Sea. Those tensions flared in 2019 when STC and government forces fought for control of Aden, before the two powers patched together a fragile power-sharing arrangement.

For the UAE, a direct return to the battlefield appears unlikely. The Houthis struck Emirati territory in 2022, and Abu Dhabi’s economy depends on projecting an image of a secure commercial hub. Having already faced intensive Iranian missile and drone attacks since the U.S. and Israel launched their war against Iran, the UAE may limit itself to backing local anti-Houthi factions, particularly given the Houthis’ markedly improved strike capabilities. Even so, Emirati involvement could prove critical. Abu Dhabi has built influence through relationships with capable militias, including the Giants Brigades and Tarek Saleh’s National Resistance Forces. Although some major Emirati-backed factions merged into Saudi-led structures after Abu Dhabi withdrew direct funding last year, residual command networks and personal loyalties remain intact. That gives Abu Dhabi leverage it can reactivate quickly, either to strengthen the coalition or to constrain Riyadh in the south.

Meanwhile, other fault lines complicate the picture. The Islamist Islah party, allegedly tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, remains a longstanding friction point. Riyadh maintains ties with Islah politicians within the recognized government, while the UAE, which has reportedly hired mercenaries to assassinate the faction’s leaders, sees no room for compromise. Saudi Arabia has also called on Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt for defensive support under the Mecca Defense Alliance, suggesting it increasingly views the UAE as less essential. Southern factions themselves remain divided over independence, autonomy and power distribution, tensions that predate Yemen’s 1990 unification. Since the U.N.-brokered ceasefire of April 2022, Riyadh has sought a negotiated exit, but renewed Houthi attacks, including deadly strikes on Riyadh airport and oil infrastructure, have exposed the limits of its containment policy.

For the citizens of Yemen, the stakes are stark. A coalition that fights the Houthis today but crumbles tomorrow, fractured by parallel channels of influence and competing endgames, would deepen the instability that has long plagued the country. As analysis from https://responsiblestatecraft.org/saudi-arabia-uae-yemen/ notes, the real test is whether renewed cooperation produces accountable financing, coherent command structures and a political process that genuinely includes Yemen’s competing factions.