Qatar's LNG Damage Drives Push to Lock In Supplies Abroad
Ras Laffan damage and Hormuz risk push QatarEnergy toward US supply deals
Iranian missile strikes in March knocked out liquefaction trains 4 and 6 at Qatar’s Ras Laffan complex, taking 12.8 million tonnes of annual capacity offline, roughly 17% of Qatar’s pre-war capacity. That damage is the operational reality behind the country’s push to lock in supplies and capacity abroad, a strategy that hedges against future shipping disruptions but cannot repair damaged facilities or reopen the export route carrying nearly all of its LNG.
The repair timeline has shifted. Energy Minister and QatarEnergy chief executive Saad al-Kaabi initially estimated three to five years. In an October 29 interview with Reuters, he put the period at about three years.
Additional reference context is available at https://www.iranintl.com/en/202611020302.
The export numbers show the gap. Qatar halted LNG exports almost completely for three months from March, with shipments recovering gradually from June. Kpler data show only 4.58 million tonnes exported in the third quarter, less than a quarter of the volume a year earlier. September reached 1.6 million tonnes, the highest monthly level since the war began, yet still under a quarter of the pre-war monthly average. About one-third of those shipments went to Kuwait and stayed inside the Persian Gulf, never transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
Delivery of what remains is itself under threat. In July the LNG carrier Al Rekayyat was struck while transiting Hormuz. On Friday evening, the Al Mayeda was hit by what its owner Nakilat described as “unidentified objects” in the Persian Gulf. Nakilat confirmed the incident on Sunday, saying no crew members were injured, no environmental damage was reported, and the vessel remained operational. Qatar condemned the attack as a “dangerous act” threatening maritime navigation and global energy supplies, and said investigations were underway to identify those responsible. The strike came the same day Qatari mediators held talks in Tehran aimed at a deal between Iran and the United States, timing that underscored the risks.
Qatar’s vulnerability is structural. LNG accounts for half of its foreign-currency export revenues, and shipments beyond the Persian Gulf must pass through Hormuz. Unlike some neighboring oil exporters, Qatar has no pipeline route capable of replacing those shipments. Oil exports amounted to just 530,000 barrels per day last year, leaving revenues largely dependent on gas. Official government statistics show 79 million tonnes of LNG exported last year, supplying 17% of global LNG consumption. Another 20 billion cubic metres of natural gas, roughly 15 million tonnes, went to the UAE and Oman through the Dolphin pipeline. By volume, LNG accounted for nearly 84% of total gas exports.
On the contracting side, the first overseas source is the Golden Pass LNG project in Texas, where QatarEnergy holds a 70% stake and ExxonMobil the remaining 30%. Production began on March 30, 2026. The project has a planned capacity of 18 million tonnes per year, giving QatarEnergy an equity share equivalent to 12.6 million tonnes once fully operational. The first train carries roughly 6 million tonnes per year, of which QatarEnergy’s share is 4.2 million tonnes.
The second element is long-term purchasing. QatarEnergy signed two agreements with Cheniere Energy on October 22 for a combined 4 million tonnes annually, split equally between the Sabine Pass terminal in Louisiana and the Corpus Christi terminal in Texas. Deliveries begin in the early 2030s and run through 2054, though 1 million tonnes of the annual Sabine Pass supply is conditional on a final investment decision for an expansion project. A week later came a 20-year agreement for up to 3 million tonnes annually from Woodside’s Louisiana LNG project, with deliveries expected from 2030 and volumes rising as additional production units start up. Together, the agreements cover up to 7 million tonnes a year.
On pricing and logistics, the Cheniere price is linked to the US Henry Hub gas benchmark plus a fixed fee. Both agreements provide for free-on-board deliveries, meaning QatarEnergy arranges transportation. Lower US gas prices can open opportunities for profitable sales into Europe and Asia, though returns depend on liquefaction fees, shipping costs and destination-market prices. Kaabi told Reuters the purchases are intended to generate revenue during future Hormuz disruptions, but cautioned that US cargoes cannot simply replace supplies under existing long-term contracts specifying particular export terminals and destinations. QatarEnergy is also negotiating with Venture Global, and Kaabi said he expects further 20- to 25-year supply agreements with US and other producers before the end of 2026.
A pipeline bypass of Hormuz has been ruled out on commercial and technical grounds. Kaabi said in September that moving gas to another coast would require new liquefaction facilities, duplicating infrastructure already being built in Qatar, and he has warned that pipelines and associated facilities could themselves become targets.
By contrast, Iran’s gas sector shows an even deeper delivery shortfall. According to the National Iranian Gas Company, March attacks knocked around 230 million cubic metres per day of production capacity offline at four gas processing plants, of which roughly 100 million cubic metres has since been restored. That leaves about 130 million cubic metres per day unavailable, some 16% of last year’s daily production. The company has warned that around 11 provinces could face supply problems this winter, and Iran’s financial capacity to rebuild is limited while foreign participation in its energy projects is virtually nonexistent.
The new contracts begin delivering in 2030 or later and remain modest against Qatar’s pre-war annual capacity of 77 million tonnes and its planned expansion to 142 million tonnes by 2030. Overseas trading can cushion the financial impact of disruption, but the harder question is whether repairs at Ras Laffan and secure passage through Hormuz can be achieved on anything like the timelines now promised.
Q&A
How much liquefaction capacity was lost at Ras Laffan and what is the repair timeline?
Trains 4 and 6 were knocked out, taking 12.8 million tonnes of annual capacity offline, roughly 17% of pre-war capacity. Saad al-Kaabi initially estimated three to five years for repairs but in an October 29 interview put the period at about three years.
What overseas supply agreements has QatarEnergy signed?
It holds a 70% stake in the Golden Pass LNG project in Texas with ExxonMobil holding 30%, signed two October 22 agreements with Cheniere Energy for a combined 4 million tonnes annually split between Sabine Pass and Corpus Christi, and a 20-year deal for up to 3 million tonnes annually from Woodside's Louisiana LNG project, together covering up to 7 million tonnes a year.
Why can Qatar not simply reroute its gas exports?
Shipments beyond the Persian Gulf must transit the Strait of Hormuz, and Qatar has no pipeline route capable of replacing those shipments. A pipeline bypass of Hormuz was ruled out on commercial and technical grounds, and Kaabi warned pipelines and associated facilities could themselves become targets.
How did Iran's gas sector fare in the March attacks?
According to the National Iranian Gas Company, about 230 million cubic metres per day of production capacity was knocked offline at four gas processing plants, of which roughly 100 million cubic metres has been restored, leaving about 130 million cubic metres per day unavailable, some 16% of last year's daily production. Around 11 provinces could face supply problems this winter.