The safety of the Gulf’s people, its ports, its energy supplies and its everyday commerce now depends on a question diplomats have circled for years: can the region’s states and Iran ever sit within the same security framework? Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, has put that question squarely on the table, calling for the Gulf states and Iran to be brought together in a shared regional security arrangement. He has described the region’s recent conflicts as a “wake-up call” for all actors, a phrase that points to the gaps in the security arrangements on which ordinary life across the Gulf currently rests.
What makes the proposal matter beyond diplomatic circles is the record of recent years. Attacks have directly targeted energy facilities, critical infrastructure and maritime navigation routes, the arteries on which regional economies and daily livelihoods depend. These episodes have shown, in the source assessment’s words, that security cannot be ensured solely through conventional military capabilities or alliance commitments. For decades, Gulf states built their strategies largely around military alliances and defence agreements with actors outside the region, particularly the United States. Recent conflicts have demonstrated that external guarantees alone are insufficient to deliver stability.
Qatar’s vision does not seek to dismantle those external alliances or its military cooperation with Washington. Instead, it aims to add a homegrown, regional layer to the existing architecture: preserving the deterrent power of external partnerships while establishing direct communication channels and confidence-building mechanisms between the Gulf states and Iran to keep crises from escalating. In practical terms, that would mean the people who depend on unhindered shipping lanes, functioning energy infrastructure and predictable regional conditions gaining an additional safeguard against escalation.
The obstacles, however, are structural. The crisis between the Gulf states and Tehran is not a temporary disagreement but a deeply entrenched structure of mistrust, shaped by ideological divisions, competition for regional influence, missile programmes, maritime security risks and the activities of non-state armed actors. From Iran’s perspective, the US military presence in the region and new security partnerships with Israel are themselves regarded as threats. Given this asymmetry, a NATO-style Gulf-Iran alliance based on collective defence is unrealistic in the short or medium term, and the success of Qatar’s proposal should not be measured against such maximalist expectations.
A more feasible path, the analysis suggests, is gradual. An initial phase could open military communication channels, establish common navigation rules to ensure maritime safety, limit attacks on energy infrastructure and activate direct diplomatic channels during crises. Such small-scale, concrete measures could over time form the foundation of a more institutionalised framework for regional dialogue, with tangible benefits for the shipping, trade and energy systems that citizens across the region rely on.
Meanwhile, another determining factor is the absence of a uniform perception of the Iranian threat within the Gulf Cooperation Council. Qatar and Oman have traditionally kept channels of dialogue with Tehran open, while the security calculations of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have followed a more uncompromising approach. Even so, the restoration of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations in recent years, mediated by China, has shown that greater space has opened for diplomacy across the Gulf. That development has not ended the rivalry, but it has revealed a willingness to make tensions more manageable. Qatar’s proposal seeks to convert this environment of dialogue into a permanent, institutionalised structure, though Doha cannot pursue it alone. A realistic path would involve GCC members first reaching a minimum consensus among themselves before moving toward a framework that includes Iran.
The inclusive structure Qatar proposes does not contradict deterrence-oriented initiatives such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement being developed between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan. Defence agreements and dialogue-oriented initiatives may appear contradictory at first glance, but they represent complementary dimensions of the same equation: alliances strengthen deterrence, while dialogue mechanisms reduce the risk of confrontation arising from miscalculation. This multilayered approach also offers opportunities for Türkiye, whose defence industry and security cooperation with Gulf states bolster deterrence while its diplomatic channels with Tehran position Ankara as a facilitating actor in crises.
Qatar’s insistence is also rooted in its own interests. With its enormous LNG exports, global investments and ambitious economic transformation goals, Doha can sustain its position only in a stable regional environment. The transformation visions of neighbours such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE likewise require uninterrupted regional peace. A large-scale Gulf war could paralyse the economic infrastructure and trade routes of the entire region, including Qatar. Doha’s mediation diplomacy, its ability to speak simultaneously with adversarial actors, extends this logic and gives it a role as a “safety valve” in regional crises.
Ultimately, Al Thani’s call is not a project that can be implemented in full in the short term. Deep-rooted mistrust, asymmetric threat perceptions, the weight of external actors in the existing framework and Iran’s reluctance to make concrete security commitments are the most significant obstacles. Yet dismissing the proposal as utopian would be a mistake. Recent crises have exposed the fragility of an externally dependent security structure, and the reality that a Gulf security architecture excluding Iran is unsustainable is becoming increasingly apparent. In the long term, a multilayered structure combining deterrence with diplomacy represents the most rational roadmap for lasting peace and collective security in the Gulf. (Originally published in Turkish by Kriter.)