Trade between Russia and the United Arab Emirates reached $12 billion in 2025, four times the pre-pandemic level, yet the war involving the US, Israel, and Iran that erupted in February 2026 has placed that relationship under its most serious strain in decades. For ordinary residents of the Gulf and for the millions who depend on stable energy supplies and open shipping lanes, the consequences of how these two countries navigate their differences carry direct, daily weight.
The analysis comes from Andrey Shelkovnikov of HSE University’s Centre for African Studies, published through Moscow’s Y. M. Primakov Center for Foreign Policy Cooperation. His report describes a partnership caught between competing obligations, and it raises an urgent question: can economic interdependence hold two countries together when their security interests pull in opposite directions?
The human cost in the UAE has been severe. When the US and Israel launched military operations on February 28, 2026, targeting Iran’s missile capacity and military infrastructure, Iran responded with strikes against Israel, American facilities, and Gulf energy infrastructure. The UAE bore the brunt. More than 2,000 attacks struck the country in the first month alone, hitting tourist districts, hotels, airports, and oil facilities across Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and Fujairah. Citizens and residents faced disruption to travel, commerce, and the energy infrastructure that underpins daily life across the region.
The UAE’s response was swift. On August 18, it accused Iran of attempting to launch ballistic missiles at its territory and indefinitely suspended all commercial and financial transactions with the Islamic Republic. The Emirates also withdrew from OPEC and OPEC+ as of May 1, citing its long-term energy strategy, though the timing reflected the depth of the rupture with Tehran.
Meanwhile, Russia’s conduct at the United Nations has complicated its standing with Arab partners. Moscow and Beijing abstained on a Security Council draft resolution condemning Iran’s attacks on Persian Gulf countries. In April, Russia vetoed a resolution submitted by Bahrain that would have authorized international forces to protect navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, a document the UAE had helped draft. Arab capitals have expressed mixed reactions, understanding Russia’s strategic interests in Iran while expecting Moscow to apply harsher pressure on Tehran. Western allegations of Russian intelligence support for Iran, which Moscow denies, have deepened the unease.
The Strait of Hormuz sits at the center of the economic stakes. Roughly 20 percent of global oil exports passed through it before the war. Oil prices surged 50 percent in March 2026 alone. Disruption there is not an abstraction for markets; it translates into higher fuel costs, supply uncertainty, and pressure on public budgets across importing nations.
A new friction point has emerged through Ukraine’s expanding security ties with Gulf states. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy toured the region in late March 2026, signing a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Arabia on March 27 and an intergovernmental agreement with Qatar the following day. In late April, Ukraine announced ten-year “Drone Deal” agreements with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, covering counter-drone expertise and joint development of unmanned aerial vehicles and air defence systems. Shelkovnikov warns that this rapprochement “carries risks for Abu Dhabi’s mediation role between Russia and Ukraine, as it could cast a shadow over the Emirates’ neutrality.” For citizens in the region who have benefited from the UAE’s position as a neutral diplomatic venue, including the trilateral Russia-US-Ukraine security talks held in Abu Dhabi in early 2026, that neutrality has practical value.
The political backdrop matters too. Both countries have positioned themselves as advocates for a multipolar world order. The UAE joined BRICS in January 2024 and obtained dialogue partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. It has not joined Western sanctions against Russia and maintained neutrality on the Ukraine conflict. Mutual investments between the two countries exceeded $40 billion in 2024, with the Emirates investing $17 billion in Russia and Russia investing over $25 billion in the UAE economy. These are not figures that either government can afford to discard lightly.
Shelkovnikov identifies several areas where cooperation could serve broader public interests. Russia could contribute to humanitarian corridors, participate in diplomatic efforts to lift the Strait of Hormuz blockade, and help create negotiation platforms that account for all sides’ interests. On logistics, a memorandum between Russia’s Rosatom and UAE-based port operator DP World on port infrastructure could be expanded, with the Northern Sea Route offering an alternative to disrupted Gulf shipping lanes. In technology, Russian companies including Yandex already operate in the UAE market, and joint projects in cybersecurity, financial technologies, and smart city infrastructure could deepen ties, though Moscow faces competition from the UAE’s existing partnerships with the US and China.
The longer-term proposal is the most ambitious. Shelkovnikov suggests that Russia and the UAE jointly participate in rebuilding Iranian infrastructure once the conflict ends, a step he argues would help gradually restore trust between Arab countries and Tehran, which he identifies as essential for any lasting regional security architecture.
The report’s conclusion is direct: “cooperation in energy, logistics, technology, and humanitarian aid are the core directions capable of sustaining and developing the partnership despite all difficulties created by the current crisis.” Whether that cooperation can survive the political pressures now bearing down on both governments is the question that residents of the Gulf, and anyone who depends on stable global energy supplies, will be watching closely in the months ahead.