Gulf Nations Face Pressure as Iran Tensions Escalate Across Region

Bahrain’s hosting of the US Fifth Fleet puts the country at the center of a regional security crisis that is now testing the patience of every Gulf government.

Ahmed Alkhuzaie, Managing Partner at the Washington-based Khuzaie Associates LLC consultancy firm, told The Jerusalem Post on Monday that Gulf governments are caught between the need to respond to Iranian threats and the imperative to avoid spiraling conflict. “While outright offensive operations are not their default posture, the possibility of limited strikes, heightened maritime patrols, or covert actions cannot be ruled out if provocations continue,” he said.

The assessment follows Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps acknowledging attacks on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Jordan, claiming to have targeted US military facilities and assets in those countries. These strikes represent a continuation of Iranian aggression that has accelerated since the collapse of a Memorandum of Understanding with Washington, with particularly intense attacks occurring in recent days. Iran’s broader effort to assert dominance over the Strait of Hormuz has, so far, largely failed to achieve its diplomatic or strategic objectives.

For ordinary citizens living along the Gulf’s coastlines and trade corridors, the stakes are direct. Repeated attacks on maritime routes threaten the supply chains and economic stability that underpin daily life across the region. Alkhuzaie put it plainly: “Our economies suffered enough, we can’t keep getting hit forever.”

The calculus for Gulf governments is growing more urgent. Alkhuzaie emphasized that regional states must navigate a narrow path between demonstrating resolve and preventing uncontrolled escalation. “The strategic imperative for these states is to balance deterrence with stability, ensuring that Iran understands the costs of continued aggression,” he explained. Whatever response emerges in coming weeks will be shaped by that balancing act.

The Peninsula Shield Force, the joint military command of the Gulf Cooperation Council, would likely serve as the primary instrument for any coordinated regional action. Alkhuzaie described it as representing far more than hardware. “It represents not only shared military capacity but also political solidarity among Gulf states,” he said. “The force has been modernized over time, with capabilities ranging from ground troops to air and naval support, designed to respond to regional threats. Its existence means that Gulf states are not acting in isolation; they can mobilize a coordinated response that amplifies their deterrent power and signals unity in the face of external challenges.”

Beyond the Peninsula Shield, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess significant independent military capabilities, while Kuwait maintains a credible defensive force despite its traditionally cautious foreign policy stance. Geography adds another layer. Oman’s proximity to the Strait of Hormuz and Bahrain’s hosting of the US Fifth Fleet both contribute to the regional security architecture. Combined with the broader US military presence throughout the Gulf, these elements form what Alkhuzaie called a “layered security network that extends beyond sheer military might.”

“Their collective geography, commanding chokepoints, coastlines, and airspace, adds strategic weight to any potential response,” he stressed. “Their political cohesion within the GCC, reinforced by the Peninsula Shield Force, ensures that even smaller states can amplify their influence through collective action. This unity, combined with external partnerships, means that the Gulf’s deterrent posture is not solely dependent on its largest members but is strengthened by the contributions and strategic positioning of all six states.”

Meanwhile, a second analyst offered a more cautious reading of how far Gulf governments are actually prepared to go. Mojtaba Dehghani, an Iranian analyst on Middle Eastern affairs, told The Jerusalem Post that Gulf states would probably tolerate Iranian attacks more readily than their public statements suggest. Their primary concern, he argued, centers on “preserving stability, investment confidence and the image that the Persian Gulf is still relatively insulated from a wider war.”

An open unilateral military response, Dehghani said, remains unlikely in the near term. He predicted an “indirect and layered response” instead, involving closer coordination with the United States, enhanced air defense integration, intelligence sharing, and improved maritime security. Gulf states would likely continue channeling diplomatic pressure through Oman and Qatar while avoiding the appearance of leading military action against Iran.

The threshold for direct Gulf military involvement would need to be substantially higher, Dehghani outlined. “Large-scale casualties on Persian Gulf soil, a major hit on Saudi or Emirati energy infrastructure, a prolonged closure of Hormuz, or a clear sense that US deterrence is no longer working” would be required to trigger such action. Until those conditions emerge, he expected Gulf states to allow Washington to carry “most of the visible military burden while they strengthen their own defenses.”

The bind facing Gulf populations is real. They need protection from Iranian aggression, yet the more visibly their governments align with a harder US-Israel security posture, the more exposed those same populations become to Iranian retaliation. As Dehghani put it, that is “the difficult balance for them.” Whether the next major attack on Gulf territory forces that balance to break is the question that now hangs over the entire region.