Gulf residents face uncertain security as regional powers reconsider defense partnerships

Gulf citizens absorbed the shock of Iranian missiles and drones striking civilian airports, hotels, and energy facilities across their region when the conflict between the United States and Iran erupted on February 28. The attacks hit Bahrain and Kuwait even after Tehran and Washington reached a memorandum of understanding to end the fighting earlier this month. For ordinary people living and working near those targets, the scale of destruction raised an urgent question: do existing security arrangements actually keep them safe?

The answer, according to analysts, is increasingly uncertain. Annelle Sheline, a research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, put it plainly: “The presence of the US military in Gulf countries had the opposite of a deterrent effect. These military bases became targets.” Rather than shielding civilian populations, American installations drew Iranian strikes, exposing airports, hotels, and energy infrastructure, the arteries of daily life, to retaliation.

That reality is now reshaping how Gulf Cooperation Council governments think about their duty to protect their populations.

Saudi Arabia has already signed a defense pact with Pakistan, an arrangement that could expand to include other regional players. For years, Gulf states have purchased defense systems from European nations while cultivating relationships with Russia and China. The conflict appears likely to deepen these ties, creating a more multipolar security architecture that reduces dependence on any single guarantor.

Anna Jacobs Khalaf, a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, stressed that diversification does not mean abandoning Washington. “The focus for countries like Saudi Arabia is the regional balance of power and pushing back on both Iran and Israel,” she said. “This doesn’t mean replacing the US with Pakistan; it means diversifying partnerships and setting up platforms like the so-called quad group of Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Egypt and Pakistan. It also means developing their own domestic defensive capabilities and developing more regional autonomy.” For citizens, that shift could eventually mean governments less reliant on foreign decisions made thousands of miles away.

Meanwhile, the threat landscape facing Gulf populations extends beyond Iran. Several states view Israel’s military posture as increasingly destabilizing. Last year, Israel bombed Doha during US-backed Gaza ceasefire negotiations in an attempt to kill Hamas leaders. President Trump stated he was “very unhappy” with the strikes on Qatar, a major non-NATO ally, and denied approving or having prior knowledge of the attack. Across the region, Israeli military campaigns in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syrian territory have added to a sense among Gulf capitals that their populations face threats from multiple directions simultaneously.

One proposed answer is economic rather than military. Sheline suggested that Gulf countries may pursue economic interdependence with Iran as an alternative deterrent to arms buildups. “If Gulf and Iranian economic interests are intertwined, Tehran would think twice before striking the region,” she said. Infrastructure projects and investment frameworks that raise the cost of conflict for all parties could, in theory, protect civilian life more effectively than missile defense systems. Vice President JD Vance recently acknowledged such efforts, noting that the United Arab Emirates has engaged in conversations with Iranian officials about economic incentives and investment conditions.

Despite the anger over Iranian attacks on civilian and military sites alike, Gulf states have maintained communication channels with Tehran at multiple levels, including security discussions. Several GCC nations are working to mend ties and expand economic cooperation with their neighbor across the Gulf, viewing mutual prosperity as a potential stabilizing force for the populations on both sides.

The broader geopolitical picture complicates these efforts. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy signals that the United States no longer prioritizes the Middle East, arguing that foreign policy resources should shift elsewhere. At the same time, Washington maintains a longstanding commitment to Israel, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has refused to accept the memorandum of understanding’s regional ceasefire demands, particularly regarding Lebanon. The Trump administration has backed a separate Israel-Lebanon agreement that effectively grants Israel freedom of action in Lebanon until Hezbollah disarms, a position that sits uneasily alongside the ceasefire framework.

Sheline identified Israel as the critical variable in whether the ceasefire produces a durable outcome for the region’s inhabitants. If Washington pressures Israel to support the deal, the United States could genuinely step back and allow regional governments greater responsibility for their own citizens’ security. If Israel acts as a spoiler, the region risks returning to cycles of tension that pull American forces back into fighting, and Gulf populations back into the crossfire.

Jacobs Khalaf described the convergence of Iranian military capability and Israeli military expansion as an “unprecedented security crisis.” The war has persuaded Gulf governments that a US-centric security model leaves their populations exposed, both to direct attack and to the consequences of American strategic decisions made with other priorities in mind. Whether the emerging architecture of regional partnerships, domestic defense investment, and economic diplomacy can actually deliver the safety that existing arrangements failed to provide remains the open question facing every government in the Gulf.